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BY REASON THEREOF: CAUSATION AND ELIGIBILITY 
UNDER THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES 
EDUCATION ACT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As an adolescent, A.D. suffered from both Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD") and a speech impediment. 1 
By the time he entered the seventh grade, A.D . began 
exhibiting various behavioral problems that eventually led to 
his placement in the "At Risk" program at his junior high 
school.2 The following year, A.D. continued to struggle with 
behavioral problems at school as he faced traumatic difficulties 
at home, including the death of his baby brother and increased 
tensions between himself and his stepfather. 3 During this time, 
A.D. also began abusing alcohol. 4 Ultimately, the school 
suspended A.D. for ten days as a result of his increasingly poor 
behavior and, in particular, an incident in which A.D. robbed a 
school-sponsored concession stand.5 Although A.D.'s mother 
requested special education services for her son on the basis of 
his ADHD,6 A.D. was ultimately deemed ineligible for special 
education by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit because the court concluded that A.D.'s need for 
services was not caused by his ADHD. 7 This comment explores 
L Alvin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. A.D. ex rei. Patricia F. , 503 F .:3d :n s, :379-80 (5th 
Cir. 2007) (A.D. received special education services on the basis of his speech 
impediment and his ADHD until he completed the third grade, at which time his 
mother and the school district agreed that he no longer required such services). 
2. !d. at :l80. The Fifth Circuit did not discuss A.D.' s behavioral problems in 
much detail. However, the district court's opinion described a pattern of behavior that 
included "hitting another student's arm , throwing spitballs, throwing pencils, using 
obscen e language, dress code violations, verual confrontations, and various other 
disrespectful and disruptive behaviors." Alvin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. A.D. ex rei. Patricia 
F .. 2006 WL 28805 1:3, *3 (S.D. Tex. 2006). 
:3. Aluin, 50:1 F . ad at :380. 
4. ld. 
5. !d. 
6. l d . 
7. ld. at :184. 
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the issue posed in cases like A.D.'s, in which children with 
qualifying disabilities are denied special education services 
because a court or other hearing authority determines that 
their needs for such services are not caused by the disabilities 
themselves . 
Special education law is primarily governed by the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"),x which 
provides federal funds to state and local education agencies 
that provide a "free appropriate public education" to students 
with disabilities.9 While the IDEA requires a causal link 
between a qualifying disability and the need for special 
education services, 10 neither the IDEA itself, nor the federal 
regulations that implement it, provide guidance on how to 
interpret this requirement. 11 This comment demonstrates how 
courts and other hearing authorities may utilize principles of 
statutory construction and notions of causation derived from 
tort law in order to confront problems of mixed causation in 
IDEA eligibility cases in a way that better adheres to the 
legislative purposes of the IDEA. 
Part II of this comment provides background on the IDEA, 
its history and purpose, and how it defines "a child with a 
disability." Part II also provides a brief overview of how 
eligibility determinations are made under the IDEA and the 
services available to those students who are deemed eligible. 
Part III provides a more in-depth look at the problem presented 
in A.D.'s case and other similar cases, and explores different 
ways courts interpret the IDEA's eligibility provisions when 
faced with problems of mixed causation. Part III also describes 
the difficulties inherent in determining the causes of 
behavioral and academic problems for many students with 
certain types of disabilities, as well as the consequences that 
may result when students with certain disabilities fail to 
receive the services they need. Part IV then uses principles of 
statutory construction and causation theory derived from tort 
law to explain how the causation requirement in the IDEA 
8. 20 U.S.C . §§1400-1415 (2008). While § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 
U.S.C. §794 (2008), is also relevant to special education law, it is outside the scope of 
this comment. 
9. 20 U.S.C. §J412(a)(l)(A). 
10. See 20 U.S.C. §1401(3)(A) (the IDEA confers eligibility on those students who 
have a qualifying disability and who "by reason thereof' need special education). 
11. See 34 C. F.R. §§:300.1 - 300.818 (2008). 
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eligibility provisions should be interpreted by courts and other 
hearing authorities in order to apply the IDEA in accordance 
with its legislative purpose. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES 
EDUCATION ACT 
A. History and Purpose 
Prior to 1975, the future looked bleak for many individuals 
with disabilities. 12 Hundreds of thousands of disabled persons 
were housed in state institutions, where they often failed to 
receive educational or rehabilitative services. 13 Moreover, a 
lack of resources at many public schools and a widespread 
failure to diagnose and to understand certain types of 
disabilities forced many disabled students to venture outside 
the public education system in search of appropriate 
educational services. 14 In order to address these problems, 
Congress enacted the Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act in 1975. 15 While the Act successfully improved educational 
opportunities and results for students with disabilities, its 
implementation was sometimes hampered by inefficient 
methodologies and low expectations regarding the academic 
potential of disabled children.16 
In 1990, the Act was amended and renamed the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act. 17 Congress expanded the class 
of protected persons "in recognition of the changing dynamics 
of special education ... . " 18 These amendments also expanded 
12. See Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services , U.S. Office of 
Special Education Programs, HISTORY: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF PROGHESS IN 
EDUCATING CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES THROUGH IDEA 2 (2000), available at 
http://www.ed.gov/policy/speced/leg/idea/ 
history.pdf. 
13. !d. at 2-3. 
14. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (2008). 
15. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§1400-
1415 (1975)). See Moira O'Neill, Delinquent or Disabled? Harmonizing the IDEA 
Definition of "Emotional Disturbance" with the Educational Needs of Incarcerated 
Youth, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1189, 1200 (2006). 
16. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(3)-(4) (2008). 
17. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 
§901, 104 Stat. 1141, 1142 (1990). 
18. Wendy F. Hensel, Sharing the Short Bus: Eligibility and Identity Under the 
IDEA. 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1147, 1156 (2007). 
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the services available under the IDEA and, in particular, added 
a requirement that transition services be provided to help 
disabled students depart from the public education system and 
enter their adult lives. 19 Then, in 2004, Congress reauthorized 
the IDEA20 in an attempt to incorporate it more fully into 
President Bush's No Child Left Behind philosophy. 21 
In reauthorizing the IDEA, Congress stated in its findings 
that "[i]mproving educational results for children with 
disabilities is an essential element of our national policy of 
ensuring equality of opportunity, full participation, 
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for 
individuals with disabilities."22 Furthermore, Congress 
identified protecting the rights of all disabled children and 
their parents, 23 as well as providing all disabled children an 
education designed to meet their unique needs, as purposes of 
the reauthorized IDEA. 24 Unfortunately, current interpretation 
of the causal link required by the IDEA's eligibility provision 
has caused the IDEA to fall out of line with these purposes. 
B. Defining a "Child with a Disability" 
In order to be eligible for special education and related 
services, a student must be a "child with a disability."25 The 
IDEA defines a "child with a disability" as a child having 
"mental retardation, hearing impairments (including deafness), 
speech or language impairments, visual impairments 
(including blindness), serious emotional disturbance ... 
orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other 
health impairments, or specific learning disabilities . . . and 
who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related 
services."26 Although these provisions may appear easy to 
19. Cynthia L. Kelly. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act - The Hight 
'IDEA' for All Children's Education, 75 J . .KAN. B.A. 24, 25 (2006). 
20. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1415 (2008). 
21. Nicholas L. Townsend, Framing a Ceiling As a Floor: The Changing 
Definition of Learning Disabilities and the Conflicting Trends in Legislation Affecting 
Learning Disabled Students , 40 CHEIGHTON L. REV. 229, 255-56 (2007). The No Child 
Left Behind philosophy emphasizes equality of educational opportunity with res ults 
measured by performa nce on state academic proficiency assessme nts. See, 20 U .S.C. 
§6:301 (2008). 
2Z. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(l) 
2il. 20 U.S.C. §1400(d)(l)(B). 
24. 20 U.S.C. §1400(d)(l)(A). 
25. 20 U.S.C. §1414(a)(l)(B). 
26. 20 U.S.C. §1401 (2008) (emphasis added). Each of the quali(ying disabilities is 
1] CAUSATION AND ELIGIBILITY UNDER THE IDEA 177 
interpret, they pose significant challenges for courts and other 
authorities charged with determining eligibility for special 
education and related services because of the lack of clear 
guidance in the IDEA with respect to many of the key terms 
used in these provisions and in the federal regulations that 
implement them. 27 Although several of these challenges have 
been explored in commentary,28 the causal link required by the 
"by reason thereof' language has been left untouched by 
commentators. 
One possible explanation for the lack of discussion 
surrounding the "by reason thereof' requirement may be the 
belief that the requirement of causation has been incorporated 
into another eligibility requirement of the IDEA.29 The IDEA-
implementing federal regulations require in the definition of 
each of the enumerated disabilities that the student's 
particular disability "adversely affect" the student's academic 
performance_:lO For example, although "speech impairment" is 
listed in the federal regulations, a student's speech impairment 
must "adversely affect [the student's] educational performance" 
in order for it to rise to the level of a qualifying disability. 31 
Once a hearing officer determines that a student's speech 
impairment "adversely affects" his academic performance, it 
may seem obvious to that officer that the student needs special 
education services "by reason of' that speech impairment. 
While it may appear that these two requirements are asking 
the same question, they are the subjects of very different 
debates over interpretation. With respect to the requirement 
that a disability "adversely affect" a student's "educational 
performance," controversies have formed over how broadly the 
term "educational performance" should be construed and over 
enumera ted and furth er defined in the IDEA-implementing federal regulations. See :-14 
C.P .R. §:300.8(c)(l)- (1 :-l) (2008). 
27. Hobert A. Garda, Jr. , Who i:; Eliuible Under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Improvement Act( , :35 .J.L. & ElllJC. 291, 292 (2006) ("These apparently 
s imp le provisions a re in fact a mong the most complex requiremen ts of IDEA."). 
28. Id.; Hobert A. Garda Jr., Untangling Eliuibility Requirements Under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act , 69 Mo. L. REV. 441 (2004); Hensel , supra 
not!' l il . 
29. Sec Garda, supra note 27, at 294 (noting tha t. beca use the IDEA-
implementing federal regulations require the disability to adversely affect the student's 
edu cational performance in order for eligibility to attach, "most courts and hearing 
officer s identify only a two-par t tes t for IDEA eligibility"). 
:30. S ee :i4 C. F.R. §:300.8(c)(l)-(13) (2008). 
:i l. 34 C.F.R. §:300.8(c)(ll). 
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how "adverse" the effects of a student's disability must be on 
that performance.32 Although the "by reason thereof' 
requirement has not yet been fully explored, courts struggle to 
define the term "need" as it is used in that subsection of the 
IDEA eligibility provisions as a separate requirement from the 
"adversely affects" requirement. 33 Moreover, it is important to 
recognize that these requirements are actually two separate 
elements of IDEA eligibility, both as a matter of statutory 
construction34 and as a matter of judicial precedent.35 
Therefore, in order to be considered eligible for special 
education services, a student must (1) have an enumerated 
disability, (2) that adversely affects his educational 
performance, and (3) by reason thereof, need special education 
services. 
Further complicating the issue of causation in many IDEA 
eligibility cases is the fact that many of the definitions of 
qualifying disabilities incorporate additional elements of 
causation beyond the "adversely affects" requirement. For 
example, a student with autism will not be classified as autistic 
under the IDEA-implementing federal regulations if that 
student's academic performance is adversely affected primarily 
because of an "emotional disturbance."36 The definition of 
"emotional disturbance," in turn, specifically excludes from 
eligibility those students whose problems are caused by "social 
maladjustment," a term that is not defined in either the federal 
regulations or by experts in the field. 37 Similarly, the definition 
of "specific learning disability" excludes students whose 
32. See ~tenerally, Garda, supra note 27 , at 295-306 (identifying a number of 
disagreements among courts with respect to those terms). 
::a. /d. at 806- 815. 
34. See infra. notes 107- 110 and accompanying text (explaining that, as a matter 
of statutory construction, the words "by reason thereof' must be given their due effect 
as the words chosen by the legislature in crafting the IDEA). 
35. See Mr. I. ex rel. L.I. v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 5!), 480 F. 3d 1, 1:~ (l s t 
Cir. 2007) (distinguishing the "adversely affects" requin!ment from the "by reason 
thereof' requiwment) (citing Ma rk C. Weber, Special Education Law and Litigation 
Treatise~ 2.2(1) at 2:4 (2d ed. 2002); Garda, supra note 28, at 490-91) . 
:i6. 84 C.F.R. §:300.8(c)(1)(ii) (2008). 
:37. 34 C. F.H. §a00.8(c)(4)(ii) (2008) S1~e. e.g, Kenneth W. Me rrell a nd Hill M. 
Walker, IJeconstructin{? a Definition: Social Maladjustment Versus Emotional 
Disturbance and Moving the EBD Field Forward, 41(8) PSYCHOL. Sell. 899, 901 (2004). 
("[T]hc description of this construct has been left to individu als and organizations 
within the fie ld, as well as to the state a nd local education agencies responsible for 
implementing special education services . .. However, there has never been a single 
description of [social maladjustment] that has been universally recognized."). ld. 
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learning problems are caused by "environmental, cultural, or 
economic disadvantage[s]."38 
These definitions, while making the determination of 
causation and eligibility even more complicated for courts, can 
also provide another means-beyond incorporation of causation 
into the "adversely affects" requirement-for some authorities 
to deny eligibility on causation grounds without directly 
referencing the "by reason thereof' requirement. For example, 
the exclusion of "social maladjustment" from the definition of 
"emotional disturbance" in the federal regulations may allow 
authorities to exclude from eligibility those students whose 
behavioral problems may at least partially stem from external 
contributing factors (i.e., drug use, sexual abuse, or problems at 
home). One such case involved a young man identified as 
M.C.39 
When M.C. was in the seventh grade, a male cousin began 
sexually abusing him.40 The abuse escalated over the next two 
years, despite a protective order against the cousin.41 When he 
was in the ninth grade, M.C. was diagnosed with ADHD.42 
During the 2002-2003 school year, when M.C. was in the tenth 
grade, he was suspended three times: once for fighting, once for 
assaulting a fellow student, and once for marijuana 
possession.4] Amid this flurry of suspensions, M.C.'s parents 
requested special education services for their son from the 
school district's Committee on Special Education ("CSE").44 In 
May 2003, the CSE determined that M.C. was not eligible for 
special education services under the IDEA because he failed to 
meet the criteria for classification as emotionally disturbed.45 
A second CSE meeting in July of that year affirmed the 
determination of ineligibility.46 Although the second CSE 
meeting was the first time the evidence of M.C.'s past sexual 
abuse was brought to light,47 "[t]he CSE believed that it was 
aH. :~4 C.F.R ~:l00 .8(c ) ( lO)(ii) (200H). 
39. N.C. ex rei. M.C. v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Di st., 4n F. Supp. 2d 5:12 (S. D.N.Y. 
2007). 
40. Id. nt 5cl5. 
41. !d. 
42. ld. at 5:3fi. 
43. ld. 
44. ld. 
45. M.C., 47:l F. Supp. 2d at 5:l7 . 
46. ld. at fi3H. 
47. ld. at fi:37. 
180 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2009 
M.C.'s drug use that caused his deterioration , rather than the 
sexual abuse."48 This view was echoed by the Independent 
Hearing Officer ("IHO") in February 2004.49 For M.C., this 
distinction, with respect to causation, meant the difference 
between eligibility via classification as "emotionally disturbed" 
and exclusion via classification as "socially maladjusted."50 
When the case finally reached the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York, the district court 
continued to cite drug abuse as the cause of M.C.'s problems at 
school. 51 While the court conceded that there was 
"disagreement among the various professionals who treated 
M.C. about the extent of his psychological problems and the 
role that his drug use played in his state of mind,"52 the court 
nonetheless concluded that M.C. was not eligible for services 
under the IDEA. 53 M.C.'s case demonstrates one more way 
courts currently confront the complexity of causation issues in 
IDEA eligibility cases, even without explicit reference to the 
"by reason thereof' provision. 
C. Making Eligibility Determinations54 
The road to accessing special education services begins with 
an evaluation of the student. 55 A written request for an 
evaluation of the student may be made by the student's 
parent(s) or by a state or local education agency. 56 During the 
evaluation, the educational agency employs a variety of 
methodologies in an effort to determine whether the student is 
suffering from a qualifying disability and, if so, the educational 
48. lei. at 538-:19. 
49. !d. at 5:-19. ("In sum . IHO Kandil akis agreed with th e analysi s that drug use , 
and not. sexual abuse, was t he reason for M. C.'s 'downward spiral ' a nd tha t a 
classification as emotionally dis turbed was inappropriate and unnecessary.") . 
50. lei . at 545. 
51. M.C., 47:3 F. Supp. 2d at 54cl. 
[>2. !d. at 545. 
f):-l. !d. at fi47. 
54. i\n in-depth examination of the process of requesting and receiving special 
education services under the IDEA is outside the scope of this comment. 'l'hmefore, this 
section will merely attempt to provide a brief overview of th e process by highligh t ing 
those features most relevant to the comment's discussion of e ligibility determinations 
in cases of mixed causation. See 20 U.S. C. §1414 (2008) (detailing the evaluation and 
eligibility process): :H C.F.R. 800. fi02 (2008) (describing procedural safeguards). 
5~>. 20 U.S.C. §1414(a)(l)(A) (2008). 
56. 20 U.S. C. § 1414(a)(l)(B) 
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needs of the student. 57 Once the evaluation is complete, a 
determination of eligibility is made.58 If the party seeking 
special education services disagrees with the outcome of the 
evaluation, he or she may request an Independent Educational 
Evalua tion ("lEE"). 59 If such a request is made, the school or 
agency must respond either by paying for a new evaluation by 
an independent examiner or by showing at a due process 
hearing that the initial evaluation of the student reached the 
appropria te result. 60 
Ultimately, after exhausting the administrative remedies 
provided for in the IDEA, either party may file a civil action in 
federal district court. 61 Because federal courts lack expertise 
regarding the educational needs of children with disabilities, 
they rely on the fact -finding done by state and local education 
agencies during the administrative portion of the process.62 In 
fact, these agencies are often given significant deference by the 
courts. 63 However, both the administrative proceedings and the 
federal court proceedings in IDEA eligibility cases can easily 
collapse into contests of dueling experts due to the difficulties 
inherent in determining the causes of many types of 
disabilit ies.64 Nevertheless, some hearing authorities appear to 
be capable of reaching nuanced conclusions with respect to 
causation in IDEA eligibility cases. 65 
D. Special Education Services 
According to the IDEA, special education consists of 
fi7. 20 U.S.C. § 14 14(h)(2)(A) 
r,s. 20 U.S. C. §l414(b)(4). 
5D. .'34 C. F.R. s:300.fi02(b)(l) (2008) . 
fiO. :34 C.F.R. §:l00.502(b) . 
Gl. 20 U.S.C. § ! 4 15(i)(2)(A) (2008). 
fi2. See, e.g., Crocker v. Tenn. Secondary Sch . Athleti c Ass'n, il7::l F.2d 933, 9:35 
(fit.h Cir. 1989) (staling that. t hi s reliance on administrative fact-finding is necessary in 
order to fulfill th<• purposes of the IDEA) (citing Smith v. Robinson , 468 U.S. 992, 1012 
(1984)). 
6:3. See, e.g., Hd. of Ed uc. of Montgomery County, Md. v. S.G., 230 Fed. Appx. :330, 
:3:1 1 (4th Cir. 2007) ; P.H. v. Woodmore Local Sch. Dist., 2fiG Fed. Appx. 75 1, 753; P.R. & 
B.R. ex ref. C.R v. Woodmore Local Sch . Dist., 2007 WL 4163857, *3 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(stati ng t hat "[m[ ore weight is due to an agency's determination on matters f(H' which 
cdueational < ~xpcrtis<' is relevant" (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Fayette, Ky. v . L.M ., 478 
F.:kl :307, :n:i (6th Cir. 20(J7))); RB. ex rei. F.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist. , 496 
F. :~ d 9:J2, 9:l7 (9th Cir. 2007) (according due defe rence to the careful and thorough 
f indings of t he administrative agency). 
64. S ee infra Part III.R 
65. S ee infra notes B0-91 a nd accompany ing text. 
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"specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet 
the unique needs of a child with a disability."66 The primary 
mechanism for delivery of these services is the Individualized 
Education Program ("IEP"). 67 An IEP is defined in the IDEA as 
a written statement for each student with a disability that 
includes the student's present level of performance, annual 
goals to be met by the student, and a statement of the special 
education services to be provided to that student so that h e or 
she may achieve those goals.68 Courts, however, disagree as to 
the amount of modification necessa ry to transform general 
education into special education.69 
Differing interpretations of what qualifies as "special 
education" play a role in IDEA eligibility determinations. For 
example, the Eighth Circuit has adopted the view that any 
modification to the general education constitutes "special 
education" for purposes of the IDEA.70 Therefore, an authority 
applying the Eighth Circuit's approach would find a student 
eligible for special education services if the student could show 
that by reason of his qualifying disability he needed even a 
slight modification to the general education curriculum. On the 
other hand, the California State Educational Agency has held 
that a student who required a variety of modifications to the 
general education program was ineligible under the IDEA 
because the modifications did not constitute "special 
education," so long as they were "services offered within the 
regular instructional program."71 
III. THE PROBLEM 
A Confronting the Problem of Mixed Causation 
In A.D.'s case, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit emphasized the requirement of a causal link 
between a qualifying disability and the need for special 
education services in determining that A.D. was not eligible for 
66. 20 U.S. C. § 1401 (29) (2008) . 
67. See, e.g , Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, ~11 (1988). 
68. 20 U.S.C. §1414(d) (2008) 
G9. Garda, supra n ote 27 at 320-21. 
70. Yankton Sch . Dist . v. Schramm, 93 F .:3d 1:169, 1:174 (8th Cir. 1996) . 
71. Mountain Empire Unifi ed Sch. Dist ., 36 IDELR 29 (Cal. SEA 2001). 
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special education under the IDEA. 72 In May 2005, A.D.'s 
mother requested special education services for her son as well 
as a due process hearing with an independent hearing officer.73 
Six months later, the hearing officer concluded that A.D. 
qualified under the IDEA as a "child with a disability," and was 
therefore entitled to special education services.74 
The school district appealed the hearing officer's decision to 
a federal district court that concluded that "A.D. did not need 
special education services by reason of his ADHD," and was 
therefore ineligible for those services. 75 On appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that A.D. was 
not eligible for special education. 76 The court agreed with the 
school district's argument that "much of A.D.'s behavioral 
problems derived from non-ADHD related occurrences, such as 
alcohol abuse and the tragic death of A.D.'s brother. Thus ... 
any educational need is not by reason of A.D.'s ADHD .... "77 
Despite the emphasis placed on the "by reason thereof' 
requirement in A.D.'s case, the requirement has been 
overlooked by other authorities. 711 For example, in determining 
whether a student with Attention Deficit Disorder ("ADD") was 
entitled to special education services, the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania framed 
the issue as follows: "Acknowledging that ADD is a specifically 
named disability in the federal regulations, the District 
concedes that the remaining issue related to IDEA is whether 
or not [the student] needs special education."79 In this instance, 
framing the issue so narrowly reduces the IDEA eligibility 
inquiry to a two-factor test that does not require a causal link 
between the two factors. 
When this approach is contrasted with the approach taken 
by the Fifth Circuit in A.D.'s case, the inequity becomes clear. 
72. Alvin, 50:3 F.:3d at :384. 
73. !d . a t :lt;O. 
74. !d. at :l81. 
7G. ld . (emphasis added) (th is conclus ion appears t.o imply that although the 
district court. believed that A.D. n eeded services, it did not believe that his need was 
caused by his ADHD. The court, however, did not make this point clear). 
76. !d. at 3S4 . 
77. !d. (emphasis added) (In reaching this conclusion , the Fifth Circuit did not 
clarify how much of a rol e , if any, it beli eved ADHD had played in A.D.'s behavioral 
problems.). 
78. See Garda, supra note 29 at 294. 
79. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist. v. Bruce C. , 194 F. Supp. 2d 417, 420 (E.D.Pa. 
2002). 
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A party seeking special education services from an authority in 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania would need only show 
that the student (1) suffers from a qualifying disability and (2) 
needs special education services. 80 On the other hand, the Fifth 
Circuit approach requires proof of a third element: the party 
requesting services must show that the need for special 
education services has been caused by the disability and not by 
other factors such as drug abuse, sexual abuse, or family 
trauma. 81 
The Ninth Circuit has noted, on at least one occasion, that 
the problem posed by cases like A.D.'s has already been 
resolved by the IDEA-implementing federal regulations. 82 In 
Capistrano Unified School District v. Wartenberg, the student 
at issue, Jeremy, had been diagnosed with ADD and a conduct 
disorder. 83 Jeremy began receiving special education services 
in the second grade, however, those services were provided to 
address an unrelated diagnosis of a visual/motor impairment.84 
As Jeremy got older, his behavior and academic 
performance worsened, and he became increasingly 
aggressive. 85 Jeremy's physicians indicated that there were 
"both behavioral and neurochemical contributors" to his 
distractibility and impulsiveness, and that he required a highly 
structured learning environment. 86 An IEP was developed for 
Jeremy based on this information; however, Jeremy continued 
to fail the majority of his classes.87 When the school responded 
by offering Jeremy a new IEP that actually decreased the 
services provided to him, his parents filed for a due process 
hearing.88 
At the hearing, the school's expert psychologist disagreed 
with the previous diagnoses, and stated that he believed 
Jeremy's problems at school were the result of willful 
misbehavior. 89 The hearing officer, taking the expert testimony 
into consideration, determined that Jeremy's poor academic 
t\0 . ld. 
81. Alvin. 50::3 F.:3d at :384. 
S2. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 893 (9th Cir. 1995). 




87. !d. at 887. 
88. Capistrano, 59 F.:1d at 887. 
89. ld. at 887-8B. 
1] CAUSATION AND ELIGIBILITY UNDER THE IDEA 185 
performance was caused by his ADD, not willful misbehavior, 
but that "the two causes could not be separated out."90 The 
hearing officer found that "[s]ome of ,Jeremy's misbehavior 
might be due to his conduct disorder, rather than his specific 
learning disability, but his deficit in attention was a 
substantial cause of his behavioral problems, and J eremy's 
social and emotional problems could not be separated out from 
the symptoms associated with his specific learning disability."91 
Therefore, the hearing officer concluded that the plan offered 
by the school district was inappropriate.92 The district court 
affirmed this conclusion.93 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed and held that in 
cases where a student's academic problems are caused by both 
a qualifying disability and outside factors such as willful 
misconduct, the IDEA-implementing federal regulations 
require that the student be classified as having a "specific 
learning disability."94 However, that reading of the definition of 
"specific learning disability" has not been followed by other 
circuits who have dealt with this problem of mixed causation. 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's reasoning does not appear to be 
supported by the federal regulations, upon which the court 
claimed to be relying.95 
These differing approaches, combined with the intricate 
web of causation requirements found both in the IDEA and the 
federal regulations, demonstrate the difficulty courts have had 
in interpreting the causal link required by the "by reason 
thereof' language. The courts struggle most in cases where the 
relationship between the student's need for services and his 
disability is not immediately apparent, or has been clouded by 
outside contributing factors like drug and/or alcohol abuse, 
past sexual abuse, or other problems at home. 
B. What Causes a Student's Behavioral and Academic 
Problems? 
Students with emotional disabilities, learning disabilities, 
and other health impairments (like ADHD) are the most likely 
90. Jd. at 888-89. 
91. ld. at 889. 
92. !d. 
93. ld. a t 890. 
94. Capistrano, 59 F.~~d at 89:3-94. 
95. ;34 C.F.R. §:J00 .8(c)( 1 0) (2008). 
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to be affected by the problem of dueling experts in IDEA 
eligibility cases because those particular disabilities, and the 
causes behind them, are the least readily observable and the 
least understood. 96 Modern psychology and psychiatry have yet 
to devise a method for pinpointing the exact cause of behavioral 
and learning disabilities. 97 Throughout the IDEA 
reauthorization process, members of Congress expressed 
concerns that the category of "specific learning disabilities" was 
too broad and amorphous to be properly understood and 
applied. 98 Based on the inability of experts to fully understand 
certain types of disabilities, it seems unreasonable for courts to 
attempt to reduce the IDEA eligibility inquiry into a search for 
a single cause, or to require that the disability be the only 
factor giving rise to the need for services. However, as 
demonstrated by the hearing officer's findings in Capistrano, 99 
authorities are willing to make distinctions about the roles that 
various qualifying and non-qualifying causes may play in a 
student's behavioral and academic problems, without 
ultimately tying causation to any single factor. 
96. Hensel , supra note 18, at 1164 ("The three categories of impairment which are 
most intangible to the casual observer serve most often as the subject of eligibility 
disputes: OHI, SLD, and serious emotional disturbance"). OHI, or "other health 
impaired," is a classification used in the IDEA to describe a student who exhibits 
"limited strength, vitality, or alertness, including a heightened alertness to 
environmental stimuli, that results in limited alertness with respect to the educational 
environment" due to a chronic illness. See 34 C.F.R. §300.8(c)(9) (2008). Notably, 
ADHD qualifies as an "other health impairment." :14 C.F.R. §300.8(c)(9)(i). SLD, or 
"specific learning disability" is defined in the federal regulations as "a disorder in one 
or more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using 
language, spoken or written, that may manifest itself in the imperfect ability to listen, 
think, speak, read, write, spell, or to do mathematical calculations." 34 C.F.R. 
§300.8(c)(10). According to the regulations, a "serious emotional disturbance" is a 
condition that results in a student's inability to learn, form interpersonal relationships, 
and behave appropriately under normal circumstances. 34 C.F.R. §300.8(c)(4). 
97. Lois A. Weithorn, Envisioning Second-Order Change in America's Responses 
to Troubled and Troublesome Youth, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1338 (2005) ("Although 
many disciplinary distinctions remain, it is fair to say that modern scholarship in both 
psychology and psychiatry recognizes that the nature and causes of behavioral 
problems not only vary from one category to the next, but also from individual to 
individual."). See also, Cynthia A. Dietrich & Christine J. Villani, Functional 
Behavioral Assessment: Process Without Procedure, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 209, 211 
(2000) (stating that "[t]here is no single cause for behavioral problems" and that 
identical behavioral problems exhibited by different students are likely to be caused by 
different factors). 
98. Hensel, supra note 18, at 1154. 
99. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. 
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C. What 's At Stake? 
The lack of clarity and uniformity with respect to both the 
causes of a student's problems at school, as well as the "by 
reason thereof' language, can have serious social consequences, 
especially for those students with disabilities that are less-
easily understood. For example, students who are emotionally 
disturbed are more likely to drop out of high school and to be 
arrested within a few years of leaving high school. 10° Failure to 
identify, evaluate, and serve students with these types of 
disabilities may represent the loss of the critical last chance to 
keep them from entering the juvenile-and ultimately, the 
criminal-justice system. 101 While estimates vary, evidence 
suggests that a large percentage of incarcerated individuals 
suffer from an emotional disturbance, a learning disability, or 
both. 102 Moreover, students with emotional disabilities are 
"twice as likely as other students with disabilities to be living 
in a correctional facility, halfway house, drug treatment center 
or 'on the street' after leaving school."I(JJ This problem is 
termed by some as the "school-to-prison pipeline," in which 
students who fail to receive the services they need at school are 
pushed out of the public education system and into the criminal 
justice system. 104 The consequences demonstrate just how 
critical the need for a clear interpretation of the IDEA 
eligibility provisions is. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Despite Congress's own assertion that equality of 
opportunity for individuals with disabilities was an important 
national policy driving the reauthorization of the IDEA, 105 the 
varying interpretations of the IDEA's eligibility provision do 
not further this policy. Equal opportunities for children with 
100. Weithorn, supra note 97, at 1358. 
101. !d. at 1359. 
102. O'Neill, supra note 15, at 1190. See also DISMA:-.JTL!~G THE SCHOOL·TO-PHJSON 
PIPELINE, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 6, available at 
http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/pipeline/Dismantling_the_School_to_Prison_Pipeli 
ne.pdf. 
103. SPLCenter.org, Southern Poverty Law Center-Legal Action, School-to-
Prison Pipeline: Stopping the School-to-Prison Pipeline by Enforcing Special Education 
Law, http://www.splcenter.org/legal/schoolhouse.jsp. (last visited Oct. 4, 2008). 
104. See supra notes 101-102. 
105. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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disabilities cannot be achieved when students reques ting 
special education services from different authorities are held to 
different standards. 106 The approaches advocated in this 
comment use principles of statutory construction and tort 
causation in order to bring the IDEA back in line with its 
legislative intent-equal educational opportunities for children 
with disabilities. 
A. Statutory Construction 
When the language of a statute is unambiguous, the words 
should be given their ordinary meaning. 107 The plain language 
of the IDEA eligibility provisions suggests some sort of a causal 
relationship between a student's disability and his need for 
services, but the precise nature of this relationship remains 
ambiguous, as evidenced by the varying interpretations of the 
"by reason thereof" language. 108 This ambiguity should be 
resolved by looking at the plain meaning of the words employed 
by Congress in the statute, in light of Congress's purpose in 
enacting the IDEA. 109 
Over 100 years ago, the United States Supreme Court laid 
down the enduring principle that, when interpreting statutory 
language, courts are obligated to give meaning to every word 
and clause of the statute. 110 The approach employed by the 
106. See supra Part III.A. 
107. See, e.g. , Caminetti v. U .S., 242 U.S. 470, 41-!5 (191 7) (citing La ke County v. 
Rollins, 1:30 U.S. 662, 670- 71 (1889); Bate Refrigera ting Co. v. Sulzherger , 157 U.S . I. 
:3:3 (1895); U.S. v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 2:32 U.S. :-399. 409 (1914) ; U.S. v. First. 
Nat'! Bank, 234 U.S. 245, 258 (1914)). See also , Pa rk N' Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park a nd 
Fly, Inc., 469 U .S . 189, 194 (1985) ("Statutory cons truction must begin with the 
language employed by the Congress and the a ssumption th at the ordinary meanin g of 
that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose."). 
108. See supra Part III.A. See also, supra Part II. B. 
109. S ee, U.S . v. American Trucking Ass'n s. , :no U.S. 534, 542 (HJ40); In re 
Whita ker Constr. Co. , Inc., 411 F. ad 197, 204 (5th Cir. 2005) (stating that "' jtjhe 
fund a mental question in a ll cases of sta tutory construction is legislative intent and t.hP 
reasons that prompted the legislature to enact the la w."); In re Charter Commc'ns , l nc .. 
:393 F. 3d 771, 782 (8th Cir. 2005) (s ta ting that "[tjo the extent that ja s tatute] ... is 
fairly seen to be subject to different interpreta tions, it is ambi guous, and a ny 
ambiguity must be resolved by looking to the intent of CongreHs in its enactment of the 
legi sla tion."). 
110. Montcla ir v. Ramsdell , 107 U.S. 147, 152 (188:i) ("'ti s the du ty of the court to 
give effect, if possible, to every clause a nd word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, a ny 
construction which implies that the legislature wa s ignorant of th e nwaning of the 
langu age it employed."). This principl e has been reaffirmed in more recent cases. S ee, 
e.g , Miller v. U.S., 36:3 F. 3d 999, JOOH (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that "jc jourts mu st aspire 
to give meaning to every word of a legis lative enactme nt .. .. "): Nutraceutical Corp. v. 
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United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, 111 for example, clearly violates that principle. 
That court reduced the eligibility inquiry to a two-step process 
by stating that once a student demonstrates that he suffers 
from a qualifying disability, all he must prove is a need for 
special education services. 112 As a matter of statutory 
construction, however, the "by reason thereof' language of the 
IDEA eligibility provision may not be ignored. 
On the other hand, the approach used by the Fifth Circuit 
in A.D.'s case also contradicts principles of statutory 
construction. 113 The Fifth Circuit concluded that A.D. was not 
eligible for special education services under the IDEA because 
the court was able to identify factors other than his ADHD that 
contributed to his need for services. 114 In other words, the Fifth 
Circuit appeared to be interpreting the "by reason thereof' 
language to mean "solely by reason thereof." However, the 
Supreme Court has proclaimed that a court may not interpret a 
statute by adding its own words to it. 115 
Congress has stated that one of the driving purposes of the 
IDEA is to ensure that all children with disabilities are 
provided an equal opportunity to receive an appropriate 
education, designed to meet their unique needs. 116 A narrow 
reading of the IDEA eligibility provision that excludes those 
students whose needs are not caused solely by a qualifying 
disability from special education services runs contrary to this 
legislative purpose. Instead, courts and other hearing 
Von Eshcenbach , 459 F.3d 10:3.'3, 1039 (lOth Cir. 2006) (stating that "this rule embodies 
the belief that Congress would not have included superfluous language."); Lowery v. 
Ala. Power Co. , 483 F.3d 1184, 1204 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Cooper Indus. , Inc. v. 
Aviall Serv. , Inc., 54:3 U.S . 157, 166- 68 (2004); Juggernauth v. U.S. Att'y Gen .. 4:32 
F. 3d 1346, 1:354 (llth Cir. 2005). 
111. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
112. Bruce C., 194 F. Supp. 2d at 420. 
11:3. See supra notes 72--77 and accompanying text. 
114. Alvin, 50:3 F.ad al :~84. 
115. G2 Cases, Etc. v. U.S., :140 U.S. 593, 596 (1951) ("Congress expresses its 
purpose by words . lt is for us to ascertain- neither to a dd nor to subtract, neither to 
delete nor to distort."). This principle has also withstood t he test of time. See, e.g., 
Eubanks v. Wilkinson, 9:37 F.2d 1118, 1125 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that "[c]ourts 
generally do not add words of limita tion to statutes because they are aware of the 
dangers of int ruding on the legislative function.") ; Water Quality Ass'n Employees' 
Benefit Corp. v. U.S. , 795 F .2d 130H, 1309 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that ·'court s have no 
right first to determine the legislative intent of a statute a nd then, under the guise of 
interpret ation, proceed to either a dd words to or eliminate other words from the 
statute's language."). 
116. 20 U.S.C. §1400(d)(l)(A) (2008). 
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authorities faced with IDEA eligibility determinations should 
be more open to cases of mixed causation, while still requiring 
that the qualifying disability play some role in the student's 
need for special education services. 
In order to determine how much of a role the disability 
must play, courts should look to tort law analyses. Tort law 
provides the most comprehensive understanding of the issue of 
causation. 11 7 There is no reason to believe . that Congress 
desired the IDEA to require a stronger relationship than the 
basic cause-in-fact relationship. If it had, Congress would have 
included stronger language defining the precise relationship 
required by the IDEA. Moreover, principles of causation 
derived from tort law have been used in other contexts to 
interpret statutory language. 118 Therefore, in IDEA eligibility 
cases involving mixed causation, courts should look to 
traditional tort analyses of cause-in-fact to determine whether 
the student is eligible for special education services. 
B. Tort Law Causation as Applied to the IDEA 
The Restatement Second of Torts defines cause as conduct 
that "is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm." 119 
Despite this relatively straight-forward definition, causation is 
described as one of the most elusive concepts in all of tort 
law. 120 Over time, courts have developed a variety of tests for 
causation to address various factual scenarios, but not all of 
these analytical frameworks are appropriate for use in the 
IDEA eligibility context. For example, while the courts 
developed both "cause-in-fact" and "proximate cause" as 
causation inquiries, the analysis in this comment focuses solely 
on the "cause-in-fact" question. "Proximate cause," which was 
developed as a means of limiting liability, has no role to play in 
the context of IDEA eligibility determinations, where the 
primary inquiry involves what is causing, as a matter of fact, 
117. See supra Part IV.B. 
118. See, e.g. , Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267- 68 (1992) 
(discussing how courts have incorporated principles of proximate causation into their 
interpretations of the Sherman Act as well as the civil RICO statute). 
119. R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §431 (1 965). 
120. Richard W. Wright , Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1737 (1985) 
("[T]he causation requirement has resisted all efforts to reduce it to a useful, 
comprehensive formula and has been the subject of widely divergent views concerning 
its nature, conten t, scope, and significance."). 
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the student's need for special education services. 121 
The most common test for cause-in-fact attributes causation 
to an act "if and only if, but for the act, the injury would not 
have occurred." 122 For example, A runs a red light and hits B. If 
A had not run the red light, B would not have suffered the 
injury. Now imagine an IDEA eligibility case involving a 
student who suffers from ADHD and needs special education 
services. No outside contributing factors like drug abuse or 
problems at home are identified as possible causes of the 
student's need. The court or hearing officer determines that, 
without the ADHD, the student would not need services. In 
that case, the ADHD would be considered a "but for" cause of 
the student's need for special education services because, just 
as in the case of A and B, if the alleged cause were removed, 
the result would no longer exist. Applying this straightforward 
causation analysis, the court or hearing officer could safely 
conclude that the IDEA's causation requirement is met because 
the student needed services by reason of his ADHD. Therefore, 
the student would be considered eligible for special education 
services. 
However, as seen in A.D.'s case, IDEA-eligibility cases often 
pose more complex causation problems. One such situation that 
tort law has dealt with is the alternative causation problem, 
where only one of two or more independent factors produces 
the result, but the plaintiff is unable to determine which one it 
is. This problem was famously resolved by the California 
Supreme Court in Summers u. Tice. 123 In that case , the 
plaintiff suffered injuries to his eye and upper lip when the two 
other men whom the plaintiff had been out hunting with shot 
in his direction. 124 Although the court determined that only one 
of the defendants could have caused the injury, the plaintiff 
was unable to identify which one of the defendants had fired 
the shot that wounded him. 125 Ultimately, the California 
Supreme Court shifted the burden to each of the defendants to 
prove that he was not at fault. 126 The Restatement (Second) of 
121. See , JOSEPH W. GLANNON, THE LAW OF TORTS: EXAMPLES AN D EXPLANATIONS 
130 (3d ed. 2005). 
122. Wright, supra note 120, at 1775 ("The most widely used test of actual 
causation in tort adjudication is the but-for test."). 
123. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). 
124. Id. at 1- 2. 
125. Id. at 2-3. 
126. ld. at 5. 
192 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL r2oo9 
Torts subsequently adopted this approach for use in similar 
situations. 127 
This approach, however, is not likely to be helpful in IDEA 
eligibility cases where a number of factors are at play and it is 
unclear how many of them actually contributed to a student's 
need for special education services. 128 The burden-shifting 
approach used in this type of negligence case is also not 
practical in IDEA eligibility cases because the court cannot 
literally ask the disability and other factors to prove that they 
have not caused the need for special education services. 
Although courts could employ the Restatement's approach by 
shifting the burden of proving causation to the party 
challenging the request for special education services, the 
Supreme Court has held that parents hold the burden of 
proving violations of the IDEA. 129 
Furthermore, the purposes for employing this approach are 
different from the purposes of the IDEA. According to the 
California Supreme Court in Summers, the burden-shifting 
approach is necessary in alternative causation cases in order to 
avoid the injustice of requiring the innocent plaintiff to prove 
the apportionment of liability for his injury. 130 However, the 
IDEA is not concerned with apportioning liability for the 
student's need for special education services. Instead, the IDEA 
recognizes that "[d]isability is a natural part of the human 
experience" and seeks primarily to improve academic outcomes 
for children with disabilities. 131 Therefore, this particular 
analytical framework is not applicable to IDEA eligibility 
cases. 
The concurrent causation analysis, however, a pplies to 
cases where multiple factors have acted in concert to produce a 
single result. 132 The analysis for concurrent causation hinges 
on the sufficiency of the causes. In the case of concurrent 
127. See, RP.STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §4:33l3(:'l) (1965). 
128. See supra note 96 and accompanyi ng text. 
129. Schaffer ex rei. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 51 (2005). Prior to this 
decision , the issue of who had the burden of proof in IDEA cases was ho t ly contested. 
For a fu ller discussion of that issue, see Charles J . Russo & Allan G. Osborne, ,] r. , The 
Supreme Court Clarifies the Burden of Proof in Special Education Dne Process 
Hearings: Schaffer ex rei. Schaffer v. Weast, 208 Eo. L. REP. 705 (2006). 
l :lO. Summers, 199 P.2d at 5. 
131. 20 U.S. C. §1400(c)(l) (2008). 
132. See, e.g. Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704. 705 (Cal. 1989) 
(defining "concurrent causation" as a situation in which two separate factors 
"simultaneously join together to produce injury."). 
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dependent causes, neither of the factors would have been 
sufficient on its own to produce the result. For example, 
imagine that a student suffers from an emotional disturbance 
and recently began abusing alcohol. A hearing officer 
determines that the emotional disturbance on its own would 
not have caused the need for services because the student did 
not need services before he began abusing alcohol. The officer 
also concludes that the independent effects of the alcohol 
abuse-without taking into consideration the effects of the 
emotional disturbance-did not cause the need for special 
education services. However, now that the two conditions have 
combined, the student's behavior and academics are impacted 
in such a way that he needs special education services. 
In this example, both the emotional disturbance and the 
alcoholism would be considered "but for" causes of the student's 
need for special education services. If either of those factors 
were subtracted from the equation, the need for services would 
no longer exist. Therefore, the need must be "but for" each of 
the factors. A court or hearing officer presented with this type 
of situation should conclude that the student is eligible for 
special education services because, although the non-qualifying 
condition has played a role in his need for services, the 
qualifying disability is a cause-in-fact of his need. 
The more difficult, but perhaps more appropriate, analysis 
for IDEA eligibility cases involves concurrent independent 
causation, in which neither of the factors can be said to be a 
"but for" cause of the result. Consider the following example: 
two defendants who are unaware of each other negligently 
start fires. The fires simultaneously reach and destroy the 
plaintiffs house. In that case, neither fire would be a "but for" 
cause of the damage because eliminating either from the 
equation would not eliminate the result. If Defendant 1 had not 
started his fire, the plaintiffs house would nevertheless have 
been destroyed by the fire set by Defendant 2, and vice 
versa. 133 The Restatement (Second) of Torts deals with this 
situation by considering both fires to be "substantial factor[s]" 
in producing the result. 134 Because the Restatement defines 
legal cause as conduct that is a substantial factor in producing 
1:3:3. Sec Anderson v. Minm)apolis, 179 N.W. 45 (Minn. 1920) (example deri ved 
from th is ca se). 
1:34. Sec RESTATEM ENT (SECOND) OF T ORTS §4:32(2), illus. :l (1965). 
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the result, 135 both defendants would be held liable for the 
plaintiffs injury. 
In the IDEA eligibility context, consider a case in which a 
student is diagnosed with a specific learning disability and has 
also suffered years of sexual abuse. The court determines that 
even if the student did not have a learning disability, the 
effects of the abuse would have been severe enough on their 
own to have caused a need for special education services. This 
means that the learning disability would not be a "but for" 
cause of the need for services because removing it from the 
scenario would not eliminate the result. On the other hand, the 
court also determines that, had the student not been sexually 
abused, the student's learning disability would have 
independently caused a need for special education services. 
That means that the sexual abuse would not be a "but for" 
cause either. 
However, a court faced with this problem should employ the 
analytical framework used in concurrent independent 
causation cases. Both the learning disability and the sexual 
abuse should be considered substantial factors in causing the 
need for special education services. Therefore, the student 
should be considered eligible for special education services. 
These analytical frameworks, derived from tort law, provide 
courts and other hearing authorities faced with the problem of 
mixed causation in IDEA eligibility cases with a clearer basis 
for determining whether a student's need for special education 
services is "by reason of' his disability. Since principles of 
statutory construction require that the "by reason thereof' 
language be given its due effect, 136 these tort causation 
frameworks provide a way for courts to "show their work" with 
respect to that requirement. Although there will almost 
certainly be some cases in which the effects of a qualifying 
disability are so small that the student should be considered 
ineligible, these frameworks provide guidance for determining 
eligibility in cases that are too close to call. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although a hearing officer had previously concluded that 
Jafi. RESTA'mMENT (SECOND) OFTOR'fS §4 :31. 
1:36. 8ee supra Part IV.A. 
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A.D. was eligible for special education services, the Fifth 
Circuit held that he was ineligible because his need for services 
was not by reason of his ADHD. The court, however , did not 
explain how it reached that particular result. Other courts and 
authorities, believing that the "adversely effects" requirement 
incorporates the "by reason thereof' requirement, completely 
overlook the "by reason thereof' requirement for IDEA 
eligibility, in violation of principles of statutory construction. 
These interpretations not only have serious social 
consequences, but they also fail to apply the IDEA in 
conformity with the purpose Congress intended for the Act, 
providing services to students who need them. However, by 
following the principles of statutory construction and causation 
discussed in this comment, courts and hearing officers can 
begin to interpret and apply the IDEA eligibility provision in a 
way that enhances the educational experience and provides 
adequate and appropriate opportunities for all children with 
disabilities. 
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